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FORTHCOMING IN BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY
2 
STAKEHOLDER THEORY, VALUE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that the notion of value has been overly simplified and narrowed to 
focus on economic returns. Stakeholder theory provides an appropriate lens for considering a 
more complex perspective of the value that stakeholders seek as well as new ways to measure it. 
We develop a four-factor perspective for defining value that includes, but extends beyond, the 
economic value stakeholders seek. To highlight its distinctiveness, we compare this perspective 
to three other popular performance perspectives. Recommendations are made regarding 
performance measurement for both academic researchers and practitioners. The stakeholder 
perspective on value offered in this paper draws attention to those factors that are most closely 
associated with building more value for stakeholders, and in so doing, allows academics to better 
measure it and enhances managerial ability to create it. 





Stakeholder theory has infiltrated the academic dialogue in management and a wide array 
of disciplines such as health care, law, and public policy (Freeman, et al. 2010). Much attention 
has been paid to some basic themes that are now familiar in the literature – that firms have 
stakeholders and should proactively pay attention to them (i.e., Freeman, 1984), that stakeholder 
theory exists in tension (at least) with shareholder theory (i.e., Friedman, 1970), that stakeholder 
theory provides a vehicle for connecting ethics and strategy (i.e., Phillips, 2003), and that firms 
that diligently seek to serve the interests of a broad group of stakeholders will create more value 
over time (i.e., Campbell, 1997; Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 2009). 
Nevertheless, there are so many different interpretations of basic stakeholder ideas that theory 
development has been difficult (Scherer & Patzer, 2011). 
 In spite of its importance to stakeholder theory, little attention has been devoted to 
questions regarding what it means to create value for stakeholders and how we can measure it. 
Part of the reason for the relative absence of discussion may be that researchers assume they 
know what value means. For example, much heat and debate in the stakeholder literature regards 
the issue of who has legitimacy and to whom managers have responsibilities (e.g. Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1994; Goodpaster & O’Halloran, 1994; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). 
At their core, these studies are about who should have claim to the spoils of the firm. For 
instance, legitimate stakeholders presumably should get a larger share. An inherent assumption 
in this literature is that the concept of value is already understood as economic value (i.e., Agle, 
Mitchell & Sonnenfeld, 1999). If the only relevant value created by a firm is economic then the 
legitimacy arguments may actually feed animosity among stakeholders – that they are all vying 
for a piece of the economic pie, and each wants a larger share. This type of animosity is contrary 




ness” of stakeholder interests and the need for all stakeholders to benefit over time through their 
cooperation (Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 2009). 
 Another major stream of literature addresses the size-of-pie issue by attempting to link 
good (i.e., generous, fair) stakeholder treatment with the creation of value (i.e., Berman, Wicks, 
Kotha & Jones, 1999; Choi & Wang, 2009; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Preston & Sapienza, 1990).  
The underlying assumption of most studies of this type is that economic measures capture the 
value created through good treatment of stakeholders, thus sidestepping the notion that much of 
the value stakeholders get from working with stakeholder-friendly firms may not be captured in 
economic measures. While economic returns are fundamental to a firm’s core stakeholders, most 
stakeholders want other things as well (Bosse, Phillips & Harrison, 2009). Attention to these 
other factors may prove critical to understanding why firms succeed over time, why stakeholders 
are drawn to (and remain with) some firms, and which firms do the most for their stakeholders. 
 These two important streams in the stakeholder literature demonstrate the need for a more 
thorough evaluation of the concept of value. A stakeholder-based perspective of value is 
important from a managerial perspective because managers tend to focus attention on things that 
lead to higher performance based on what actually gets measured (Kaplan & Norton, 1992; 
Sachs & Rühli, 2011). Rather than focusing primarily on economic measures of performance, a 
stakeholder-based performance measure challenges managers to examine more broadly the value 
their firms are creating from the perspective of the stakeholders who are involved in creating it. 
Thus, it gives managers the information they need to engage stakeholders where they are and 
enhance managerial ability to use such insights to create more value. At its core, this perspective 
is about creating a higher level of well-being for the stakeholders involved in a system of value 




From an academic researcher’s perspective, most empirical studies based on stakeholder 
theory have used a measure of stakeholder performance as the independent variable, with some 
measure of economic performance as the dependent variable (i.e., Berman, Wicks, Kotha & 
Jones, 1999; Choi & Wang, 2009; Hillman & Keim, 2001). If a broad-based measure of 
stakeholder performance instead becomes the dependent variable, with an organizational action 
or phenomenon as the independent variable, then there is much greater potential to understand 
how that phenomenon is influencing the overall value the firm creates. Further, this perspective 
suggests that while recommendations made by business scholars on how managers can create 
economic value may have merit, they could also lead managers to take actions that create 
economic value while reducing other types of stakeholder value. This, in turn, not only 
diminishes the value of the insights, it also raises questions about the ability of the firm to sustain 
its economic performance over time – especially if efforts to focus on financial returns ignore or 
erode bases of support from some of the firm’s stakeholders.  
In this paper we begin by discussing the concept of value, noting some of the ways it has 
been understood and using this understanding as a platform to argue for why we need a more 
complex view that is grounded in stakeholders. We then develop a 4-factor model of stakeholder 
value and turn to operationalizing it using the existing literature on happiness as one way of 
demonstrating the practicality of our model. We conclude by noting implications and directions 
for future research. 
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING VALUE 
Revisiting some foundational texts and thinkers in economics provides useful insights for 
this project. Adam Smith (1776) provides at least two important perspectives on “value”. First, a 




value is something that individuals should define for themselves and not allow governments or 
others to choose in their stead (Smith, 1776). Although Milton Friedman (1970) is often 
criticized as providing an amoral vision of business, a careful reading of his work also highlights 
the importance of moral ideals, particularly individual freedom – to decide how to live, where to 
work, what to buy (i.e. what is of “value”) and under what terms (i.e. what “value” they are 
willing to pay to receive the value they seek). The push to emphasize individual freedom and 
reject allowing others (e.g. government, one’s peers) to make choices for oneself is precisely the 
impetus that drives our inquiry – that individual differences in defining value are fundamental. 
Second, Smith (1776) emphasizes that healthy markets allow customers to choose – what 
they will buy, from whom (i.e. among a number of potential vendors for any given item), and 
under what terms. Such a market also operates for other stakeholder roles, including for 
employment (e.g. for whom will I work, under what terms, for what compensation). We know 
from the basics of markets that people will tend to make choices that provide them the most 
value for what value they give up. When they can find a better deal – i.e. more value for what 
they give up for it – people will tend to shift from their previous choice to this better deal over 
time. As such, if firms want to be successful, they need to find ways to improve what they do to 
better appeal to their customers.  
If we shift to other thinkers who were key in the evolution of economic thought and 
current understandings of “value”, two figures stand out: Jeremy Bentham (1789) and J.S. Mill 
(1863). Jeremy Bentham, widely credited as the “father” of utilitarianism, began the focus on 
value as measured by specific aggregate measurements of pleasure and pain. For him morality 
and good public policy were best understood in terms of decisions that maximized pleasure and 




based notions of morality (e.g. Kant). In Bentham’s view pleasure and pain were sensory-based 
phenomena that could be measured and systematized across all persons (Bentham, 1789). Other 
than attending to factors like duration and intensity that related to the total utility of an 
experience, Bentham viewed all pleasures and pain of equal standing (i.e. no qualitative 
differences). 
 While utility remained the core foundation for morality (and what should drive public 
policy), Mill (1863) believed there were critical differences across types of pleasure and pain, 
suggesting qualitative differences that had to be taken into account in any approach to defining 
or measuring utility. Mill was particularly enamored with the life of the mind and the higher 
pleasures it offered. Such innovations complicated the notion of “value” within utility, 
suggesting that value was more than simple pain and pleasure. Mill’s shift in focus in thinking 
about utility is captured in the language of the “greatest happiness” principle. That is, utility is 
not simply a collection of raw sensory experiences, but a way of understanding how certain 
experiences enabled one to live a better life. Mill’s innovation, forcing scholars to appreciate the 
qualitative differences in utility, has had wide influence (e.g. Sidgwick , 1981: 441, defines 
utility as “happiness”; Shaw, 1999, defines utility as “well-being”), including the emergent 
research on “happiness” in management (e.g. Haidt, 2006; Judge and Kammeyer-Mueller, 2011). 
Later in this paper we will return to the concept of happiness as a potentially useful way to think 
about measuring how stakeholders feel about the value they receive through their interactions 
with a firm. 
 Modern economic thought emerged from this intellectual backdrop, particularly as it 
relates to utility and the measurement of outcomes. Questions about utility and its relevance for 




headings of “welfare economics” and “social choice theory”, and relevant research has been 
developed by philosophers, economists, political scientists, game theorists, and others 
(Hausmann & McPherson, 2006; Sen, 1987). Value has been tied to a variety of factors: value as 
determined by price; value as determined by labor; value as determined by exchange; and value 
as determined by production (see Table 1). Sen (1987; 1998) argues for an array of factors, 
beyond aggregate utility, as important dimensions of value to both the individual and society, 
such as the creation of capabilities essential to development and living a good or happy life.1  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Our position in this paper is consistent with many scholars who have criticized the trend 
in economic thought, influential in an array of literatures (including management), that has 
brought a narrowing in conceptions of value (Hausman & McPherson, 2006: 133; Satz, 2010: 60; 
Sen, 1998). While simplification of the construct of value enables certain research capabilities 
(e.g. complex mathematical modeling), it also tends to obscure other critical aspects of utility 
relevant to a discussion of value – particularly dimensions that extend beyond profitability and 
economic returns. This paper draws upon some of the theory already crafted on utility and value 
while using a stakeholder perspective to address a context and set of concerns that have not been 
highlighted in existing research on value. For the purposes of this paper, we will define “value” 
broadly as anything that has the potential to be of worth to stakeholders. The term “utility” will 
be understood to reflect value a stakeholder receives that actually has merit in the eyes of the 
stakeholder – it is a function of the stakeholder’s utility function, which expresses the 
stakeholder’s preferences for particular types of value. 
                                                     
1 There are also contributors within economics and political theory who have argued for objective constraints or 
limitations on pursuits of utility maximization, whether by individuals or across society, based on normative 
principles. For example, Rawls (1971) and Nozick (1974) both argue for the critical and fundamental role of 




STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND VALUE CREATION 
Smith’s (1776) argument that healthy markets allow individuals to choose is similar to 
Freeman’s (1984) perspective that all stakeholders are “customers” – they all have decisions to 
make in terms of whether the utility a firm provides them is greater than what they give up from 
other opportunities. By this logic, firms that tend to make their stakeholders better off will be 
ones that are able to retain their support and participation and thrive over time. Stakeholders 
themselves determine their own utility functions based on individual preferences, consistent with 
Smith (1776) and Friedman (1970). Their preferences come from perceptions regarding how 
transactions, relationships and interactions with the firm influence the utility they receive. As 
mentioned previously, we will suggest in a later section that one possible way to measure those 
perceptions is in terms of the happiness stakeholders feel with regard to the utility they obtain 
pertaining to both tangible and intangible factors.  
A central premise of much of the literature on stakeholder theory is that focusing on 
stakeholders, specifically treating them well and managing for their interests, helps a firm create 
value along a number of dimensions and is therefore good for firm performance (e.g. Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; 1994; Freeman, Harrison and Wicks, 2007; Harrison, et. al., 
2010; Jones, 1995; Jones & Wicks, 1999). The existing empirical literature, reviewed by 
Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar and de Colle (2010), is generally supportive of a positive 
relationship between stakeholder-oriented management and firm performance, which is almost 
always measured in terms of financial returns (i.e., Berman, Wicks, Kotha & Jones, 1999; Choi 
& Wang, 2009; Hillman & Keim, 2001). Thus, as we mentioned previously, in most stakeholder-




dependent variable. Consequently, the empirical stakeholder literature itself reinforces the idea 
that financial returns are the most relevant measure of the value created by a firm. 
Financial performance is important to many of a firm’s stakeholders, but it is not the only 
aspect of value that is important to stakeholders. Consistent with Freeman’s (1984) fundamental 
idea that a firm should serve multiple stakeholders, firm performance might be defined as the 
total value created by the firm through its activities, which is the sum of the utility created for 
each of a firm’s legitimate stakeholders. Phillips (2003) identifies a firm’s legitimate (or 
normative) stakeholders as those groups to whom the firm owes an obligation based on their 
participation in the cooperative scheme that constitutes the organization and makes it a going 
concern. They include customers, communities in which the firm operates, suppliers of capital, 
equipment, materials, and labor. Firms may have other legitimate stakeholders specific to their 
own situations. 
Conflict or Cooperation 
Much of the existing business literature posits that the interests of stakeholders are in 
conflict. This is understandable. A simple identification of stakeholders and their interests tends 
to generate lists that point even the casual observer in different directions as we move from one 
group to the next. Particularly if we start with the view that the firm has a fixed pie of resources, 
each group will be vying for as many of those resources as they can – and the success of any one 
group in getting resources diminishes the amount left for the others. Folding in assumptions from 
agency theory about the motivation and disposition of stakeholders, particularly that they are 
self-interested and with guile (Williamson, 1985), the picture of deep-seated conflict among 
stakeholder interests is vividly drawn. In contrast, one of the underlying arguments, found 




tend to perform better when they see stakeholder interests as joined, or at least largely 
overlapping, than firms that see them as primarily conflicting (i.e., Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 2007; Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, 2004).  
Fortunately, we know from the experience of real firms that organizations are able to 
operate in ways that draw in stakeholders and create enough overlap in their interests for them to 
function. Conflicts of interest and tensions among stakeholders still exist, particularly in cases 
that highlight those potential tensions (e.g. where the focus is on the allocation of a fixed pie of 
resources at a given point in time). However, stakeholder theory highlights the underlying 
overlap of stakeholder interests in generating value and describes the operations of a firm as a 
mechanism for all stakeholders to become better off over time (Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 
2007). This argument is supported by the idea that stakeholders depend on the firm and its other 
stakeholders to satisfy their own interests. Stakeholder interests are inseparably connected in a 
system of value creation in which each stakeholder provides resources or influence in exchange 
for some combination of tangible and/or intangible goods (Sachs & Rühli, 2011). The quality of 
contributions of each stakeholder to the system influences the total value created in the system 
(Susniene & Vanagas, 2006). 
Part of what holds stakeholder cooperation together and generates utility for stakeholders 
is the presence of shared norms that go beyond strict self-interest. Researchers from a variety of 
disciplines have demonstrated that most people operate within norms of fairness and 
reciprocation (Becker, 1986; Cialdini, 1984; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Fehr & Gachter, 
2000; Rabin, 1998; Rawls, 1971), while other scholars have gone so far as to suggest that love is 
a motivating agent in organizations (i.e., Argandoña, 2011) – all of which may provide both 




of value for stakeholders. The fact that they voluntarily come together to participate as 
stakeholders of the firm is powerful evidence that their interests are overlapping and reinforcing 
to a substantial degree. 
A STAKEHOLDER-BASED PERSPECTIVE ON VALUE 
 We now present a stakeholder-based perspective on firm performance that is derived 
from the value a firm creates through its activities. It is based on the core ideas that all of the 
firm’s legitimate stakeholders have customer-like power to engage or not to engage with a firm 
and that the utility that is created for one stakeholder is dependent, in part, on the behavior of the 
firm’s other stakeholders. Furthermore, stakeholders determine their own utility functions. The 
amount of utility they receive from the firm influences whether they choose to engage with the 
firm and how they act when engaged in transactions with the firm.  
Our perspective focuses on four factors that emerge from a focus on stakeholders and the 
value they seek from relations with a firm. The factors incorporate not only the tangible value 
stakeholders seek, but also consider the process and distribution of value (Harrison, Bosse & 
Phillips, 2010). The four factors are defined in terms of the perceived utility stakeholders receive 
from the firm, consistent with the idea that perception influences utility (Barney, 2011). They 
are: 1) stakeholder utility associated with actual goods and services, 2) stakeholder utility 
associated with organizational justice, 3) stakeholder utility from affiliation, and 4) stakeholder 
utility associated with perceived opportunity costs. 
 These factors were selected among the many that could have been included specifically 
because they have been identified in previous research to be important to stakeholders (Ashforth 
& Mael, 1989; Bosse, et. al, 2009; Spiller, 2011; Susniene & Vanagas, 2006) and they are broad 




Consequently, they are closely associated with the motivation of stakeholders to cooperate in the 
value creating activities of the firm. That is, each category is important at the individual level, 
yet it simultaneously relates to the value that is sought by the group of stakeholders associated 
with the firm and therefore helps establish how and why they cooperate successfully over time 
(e.g. they seek these particular goods and services; they value the sense of fairness and shared 
norms the firm provides; they believe they get the best deal from their association). While there 
are a wide array of other specific things one might cite as important to individual stakeholders, 
there is a need for parsimony in any model: to offer a model that is both specific enough to 
capture core features and broad enough to capture the range of the phenomenon in question.  
Physical Goods and Services 
Perhaps the most obvious source of utility for stakeholders is found in the physical goods 
and services provided by the firm, where physical goods also include financial remuneration in a 
variety of forms. Economists have studied exchanges of goods and services for centuries. The 
field of marketing also has developed elaborate theories regarding how customers determine the 
amount of value they are willing to part with in exchange for something they want. Some of the 
value given up includes time and effort, as well as uncertainty regarding the extent to which 
whatever is purchased will really provide the expected level of utility. A reasonable goal for the 
firm with regard to its customers is to create goods and services that are perceived as providing a 
highly positive ratio between the utility received and the value given up (Barney, 2011). 
Similar thinking is applicable to all of a firm’s legitimate stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). 
Suppliers give up goods and services as well as time and other resources, and are subject also to 
transaction uncertainties, in exchange for financial (and other forms of) payment. Financiers 




Employees give of their time, efforts, and other resources in exchange for wages and other firm-
specific tangible benefits. Communities provide locations and infrastructure and frequently also 
provide a large part of the work force in exchange for tangible benefits such as employment of 
its citizens, tax revenues, and economic growth (through local purchases). Other stakeholders 
may also be included in this list depending on the situation of the firm. As with customers, the 
goal for a firm is to create the best value possible as perceived by stakeholders such that the 
utility they receive is sufficient to warrant continued, cooperative engagement with the firm. 
Organizational Justice  
Researchers from a variety of disciplines have demonstrated that most people operate 
within norms of fairness and reciprocation (Becker, 1986; Cialdini, 1984; Cropanzano & 
Mitchell, 2005; Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Rabin, 1998; Rawls, 1971). The organizational justice 
literature examines several types of fairness. Distributional justice means that actors believe that 
material outcomes received as a result of transactions with another party are perceived as fair in 
comparison with the material outcomes received by other parties (Adams, 1965; Rabin, 1993). 
Procedural justice pertains to the fairness of the rules and procedures used to assist in making 
decisions that have an impact on another party (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson & Porter, 2001).  
Interactional justice describes the ways people treat each other in regular interactions 
(Cropanzano, Bowen & Giulliland, 2007). A firm that treats stakeholders respectfully would be 
considered interactionally just.  
Organizational justice is important to value creation because people reciprocate and they 
value being treated fairly (Blau, 1964; Simon, 1966). For instance, a worker who is paid more 
than their opportunity cost of staying with a particular employer is likely to reciprocate by 




perspective a firm that pays more than an employee’s opportunity cost is wasting resources. We 
acknowledge this, but would argue that the reciprocation argument does not apply only to 
financial remuneration. Distributive justice, most closely associated with economic factors, is 
supplemented by perceptions of procedural and interactional justice as stakeholders assess how 
much utility they are receiving from a firm. For example, a firm might provide a wage and 
benefits that satisfy, but do not exceed, employee expectations based on distributive justice. 
However, employees might still receive utility from the firm that is worthy of positive 
reciprocity due to the way they are treated from the perspectives of both procedural and 
interactional justice. Similar logic applies to all of a firm’s stakeholders. The key is to determine 
what matters to stakeholders and to provide for them an amount of utility that they perceive as 
favorable (Harrison, Bosse & Phillips, 2010). Negative reciprocity can likewise have a negative 
impact on human behavior (Bewley, 1998). 
Thus far our discussion has focused on dyadic relationships between a firm and each of 
its individual stakeholders, and the resulting reciprocity. However, stakeholder theory also 
provides a lens for understanding how the way a firm treats one stakeholder can influence 
relationships with other stakeholders (Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 2007; Rowley, 1997). In 
other words, the influence of the whole group of stakeholder relationships on the value created is 
greater than the sum of the influence of each relationship taken separately. This form of 
interdependence is associated with a phenomenon called generalized exchange (Ekeh, 1974). 
Generalized exchanged involves multiple actors who are part of an integrated set of 
transactions in which reciprocations are indirect in the sense that there is not a one-to-one 
correspondence between what actors take from and give to another actor (Ekeh, 1974; Bearman, 




events that are significant to the actors (Wade-Benzoni, 2002). The actors put events in the 
context of other events that have happened over time. Generalized exchange explains why 
stakeholders are sometimes willing to sacrifice some of the value they receive if they believe it is 
in the best interests of other stakeholders or the firm over time. For instance, employees may be 
willing to take a pay cut or suppliers may be willing to re-write a contract if they believe it will 
be good for the firm’s entire network of stakeholders (Harrison, et. al, 2010). Other examples of 
generalized exchange are found in the kinship structures of primitive peoples, barn raisings, or 
sharing software on the Internet (Molm, Collett & Shaefer, 2007). Bosse et al. (2009: 449) 
explain that “third-party observers of an exchange will systematically reward or punish those 
they perceive as fair or unfair, respectively.” Generalized exchange, then, provides a partial 
answer to the question of why the whole of stakeholder relationships can be greater than the sum 
of its parts. That is, the way a firm treats one stakeholder influences relationships with others.  
 Trust, understood as a willingness of one party to be vulnerable to another with the 
expectation of non-opportunistic behavior, is important to both reciprocity and generalized 
exchange and is fostered by the presence of fairness in relationships among parties (Mayer, Davis 
and Schoorman, 1995). Assuming bounded rationality (Cyert and March, 1963), a stakeholder is 
probably unlikely to exhibit behaviors such as incremental effort, generosity, and loyalty unless 
there is some expectation that the firm can be trusted to reciprocate by distributing some of the 
additional value created back to the stakeholder. This additional value might come in the form of 
more or better tangible goods and services, which may include financial remuneration 
(distributional), greater consideration of the needs of the stakeholder in organizational decision 
processes (procedural) or simply better treatment during transactions (interactional). Trust is also 




(Harrison, et al., 2010), which is essential to the rapid and efficient development of new 
technology that is a hallmark of value creation in the modern global economy. 
Organizational Affiliation 
Stakeholders also receive utility from affiliating with organizations that exhibit behaviors 
that are consistent with things they value. They identify with the firm. Social identity theory 
explains that people tend to classify themselves into social categories associated with organizations 
and other types of groups in an effort to understand who they are (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). If the 
firm embodies characteristics that are considered valuable by, for example, its employees, 
organizational affiliation can provide feelings of connectedness, esteem, and empowerment 
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg & Turner, 1985). As employees invest energy, effort, time and 
attention in the firm they develop feelings of “ownership”, which provides a sense of 
responsibility, shared interest, and motivation to work at high levels (Pierce, Rubenfeld, & 
Morgan, 1991; Vandewalle, Van Dyne & Kostova, 1995). 
Utility through affiliation occurs, in part, through the ability of actors to obtain benefits 
from their membership in social networks (Lee, Lee & Pennings, 2001; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998; Portes, 1998). From a stakeholder perspective, group affiliation can motivate stakeholders 
to care about one another’s interests and the success of the firm (Hartman, 2011; Putnam, 2000). 
In fact, Hartman (2011: 96) suggests a similar notion about affiliation – that it can support 
collective action that benefits all stakeholders involved and serves the larger good they seek 
through their cooperation. Stakeholder desire for affiliation encourages stakeholders to 
contribute to creating more value and discourages them from behavior that destroys it. 
Utility through affiliation may also provide esteem and satisfaction. By esteem, we mean 




virtuous or desirable. Satisfaction in this context refers to actual feelings of happiness as 
stakeholders interact with an organization that exceeds what they might feel when interacting 
with some other firm in the same way. For example, a customer may feel happier about buying a 
product from a firm simply because their own value system is in some way consistent with the 
expressed and actualized values of that firm.  
Esteem and satisfaction can work in both positive and negative directions. A stakeholder 
can feel bad about identifying with a firm that has engaged in activities that are inconsistent with 
their own values, such as damaging the environment or contracting with suppliers who use child 
labor in third-world countries. This does not mean that stakeholders will necessarily cease to 
conduct business with the offending firm. Our perspective suggests that the utility stakeholders 
gain from affiliation with a firm is only one part of the package, which is then combined with the 
other factors: tangible utility, justice and fairness, and opportunity cost. For example, a 
stakeholder may continue to do business with a firm if the purely economic value of doing so 
outweighs the negative effects of affiliation. But it does mean that there is less motivation to do 
so than there would be if the firm were perceived by the stakeholder as a virtuous organization.  
Opportunity Costs and the Interconnectedness of Factors 
 Thus far we have defined utility in terms of 1) the tangible benefits created for 
stakeholders associated with the products and services of the firm, 2) the intangible benefits 
stakeholders enjoy based on just and fair treatment, and 3) the benefits of affiliating with 
particular organizations. Embedded within each of these factors is the notion of opportunity costs 
(Kerins, Smith & Smith, 2004; Spiller, 2011). As mentioned previously, utility is based on 
perception (Barney, 2011), and perception is influenced to a great degree by whether 




might expect to receive through interactions with other firms that serve similar purposes. For 
instance, members of a firm’s community are likely to compare the amount of value they receive 
in terms of tax revenues or employment opportunities to other firms in the community of similar 
size and scope or even firms in other communities. Suppliers, customers, financiers, and 
employees make similar comparisons.  
In addition to the interconnectedness of the concept of opportunity costs with the three 
other factors, each of those factors overlaps the others to some degree. For example, the way a 
firm treats a stakeholder with regard to justice and fairness influences their perceptions of the 
virtuousness of the organization (and thus utility from affiliation) and also the way the 
stakeholder feels about the tangible goods and services obtained from the relationship. Similarly, 
tangible utility from goods and services influences perceptions of justice (especially distributive 
justice) as well as utility from affiliation. Of course, utility from affiliation also influences 
stakeholder perceptions about the other two factors. What emerges from this discussion is a 
picture of a firm at the center of a network of stakeholders whose behavior is influenced, in part, 
by the treatment the firm gives to other stakeholders (Susniene & Vanagas, 2006). It is a value 
creation cycle, consistent with the systems perspective that what happens at one part of a system 
influences other parts of the system directly, and that eventually the influence returns to the 
initial part of the system to reinforce the original occurrence.  
For example, consider a case in which employees believe that they have received a good 
deal in terms of the total value they receive from a firm, compared with their opportunity cost. 
Those employees, according to the principle of reciprocity, are likely to give effort and loyalty 
above that which would otherwise be the case (Vandewalle, Van Dyne & Kostova, 1995). Their 




the firm to increase its value proposition to customers. As value to the customer increases, so 
does demand. Demand leads to growth in sales and profits, which provides more value to 
investors and surplus profits that managers can reinvest, with part of that reinvestment going 
back to employees as value in the form of higher compensation. An assumption important to this 
cycle is that the firm will continue to incorporate distributional justice such that a portion of the 
incremental value will be distributed back to employees to reinforce their behavior. 
The value creation cycle also supports negative reciprocity. For this example, we will 
begin with the customer. Assume that managers, in an effort to spike short term profits to 
enhance their own welfare with respect to compensation, reduce the value proposition to 
customers either through unjustified price increases or reduction in the quality of the product. In 
essence, they are then transferring value from customers to the firm, and ultimately to themselves 
(through bonuses or other forms of compensation). Customers recognize the reduced value and 
demand drops. Without continuing through the rest of the cycle, it is easy to understand how 
eventually the total value created in the system will be reduced. If managers persist in their 
behavior they might reduce the value proposition to customers again, resulting in a loss of 
customer demand for products, which in turn erodes future prospects for the firm.  
COMPARISON OF STAKEHOLDER-BASED WITH OTHER PERSPECTIVES ON 
FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 Thus far in this paper we have examined and adopted concepts from some of the 
fundamental economics and stakeholder literatures pertaining to the construct of value. We have 
built on this foundation a stakeholder-based perspective of performance defined as the sum of the 
utility created by a firm for its legitimate stakeholders. We will now briefly compare this 




perspectives, not for the sake of a detailed comparison, but to highlight ways in which our 
approach differs from: a shareholder perspective, the Balanced Scorecard and the Triple Bottom 
Line.  
Shareholder-based Financial Performance  
Firm performance for much of the business and economics literature is focused on 
providing financial returns, variously referred to as profits, return-on-investment (ROI), 
economic rents, or shareholder returns (for a review, see Barney, 2011, chapter 1). Many 
scholars believe that shareholders should be the highest priority firm stakeholder (i.e., Berle & 
Means, 1932; Rappaport, 1986; Jensen, 2001; Wallace, 2003), in part because shareholders do 
not have a specifiable contract with the organization, which makes them residual claimants 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). The logic continues that providing the maximum possible return to 
shareholders is the primary duty of firm managers. However, even if one resource provider or 
another does have the residual claim, why should a firm be obligated to maximize that residual at 
the expense of other resource providers? It might also be argued that stakeholders that provide 
more or better resources to a firm than their contracts require are also entitled to some of the 
surplus value created (Barney, 2011). 
Jensen (2001) argued for a single corporate objective function, “I argue that since it is 
logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a 
single valued objective function (297).” However, much has happened in the financial markets to 
expose well-entrenched economic theories upon which such arguments have been made. The 
Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman (2009) wrote, “As I see it, the economics profession 
went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking 




have to acknowledge the importance of irrational and often unpredictable behavior, face up to 
the often idiosyncratic imperfections of markets and accept that an elegant economic ‘theory of 
everything’ is a long way off”. Similarly, Barney (2011) admits that tackling issues associated 
with measuring performance from the perspective of multiple stakeholders is important even if it 
makes the process more complex. 
From a stakeholder perspective, financial performance metrics are important because 
they are important to all of the firm’s core stakeholders, but they are incomplete and 
oversimplify the roles of and utility received by the various stakeholders involved in firm success 
(Barney, 2011). Financial measures offer an important but limited perspective on value creation, 
particularly when they are tied to efforts to quantify events in terms of specific and measurable 
financial outcomes in the short or medium term - and thus reduce the ability and/or desire of 
managers to think more broadly about what a firm might do to increase total value across 
stakeholders. We should remember that what is tracked tends to be what gets managerial 
attention in an organization (Kaplan & Norton, 1992; Sachs & Rühli, 2011). Measuring 
performance through tangible and intangible factors that are important to core stakeholders, as 
proposed herein, allows organizations to better understand what stakeholders want and need – 
both as a retrospective measure of how well firms have done and to help form new ideas about 
how firms will perform in the future. If the ability to create utility for stakeholders matters, and is 
a central predictor of future firm performance, then it is important to find ways of capturing more 
complex notions of value in a systematic and comprehensible fashion.  
 Furthermore, most financial performance measures are so aggregated that they are not 
particularly useful in pinpointing problems within the organization (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987). In 




stakeholders, it is in a much better position to pinpoint potential sources of problems within the 
system that are reducing the amount of total value created. 
The Balanced Scorecard and Triple Bottom Line 
Some progress has been made with regard to measuring (and controlling) performance 
across multiple perspectives. The two most prominent examples are the Balanced Scorecard 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1992) and the Triple Bottom Line (Elkington, 1999). A multiple-perspective 
approach has also been advocated by other authors (i.e., Atkinson, Waterhouse & Wells, 1997; 
Cameron, 1980; Chakravarthy, 1986; Connolly, Conlon & Deutsch, 1980); however, we will 
focus on the Balanced Scorecard and Triple Bottom Line because they have received 
considerable attention and have been influential with practitioners.  
The Balanced Scorecard examines firm performance from the perspective of finances, 
customers, innovation and learning, and internal efficiency. In advocating for the Scorecard, 
Kaplan and Norton (1992) argue: “Senior executives understand that their organization’s 
measurement system strongly affects the behavior of managers and employees. Executives also 
understand that traditional financial accounting measures like return on investment and earnings 
per share can give misleading signals for continuous improvement and innovation… The 
traditional financial performance measures worked well for the industrial era, but they are out of 
step with the skills and competencies companies are trying to master today (172).” 
Some of the arguments made by Kaplan and Norton (1992) apply equally well to a 
stakeholder-based performance construct. For instance, they argue that their four performance 
areas are connected. This is also an important feature of our stakeholder-based perspective. 
Furthermore, their model is multi-stakeholder in that they recommend measuring customer 




However, they leave out some important stakeholders, such as suppliers and communities, who 
also supply essential resources. And although the Scorecard measures four areas, the primary 
dependent variable is still financial returns (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). The other three areas are 
present to facilitate maximizing profits – thus, instead of creating a richer conception of value, 
this sort of measure attempts to oversimplify and monetize it, creating the appearance of 
measurability and commensurability across categories. In essence, this perspective on value 
simply adds additional factors to consider and measure while retaining the conception of value 
provided by the shareholder view.  
 The Triple Bottom Line, on the other hand, includes the broad interests of society directly 
(Elkington, 1999). It is based on the idea that firms should measure performance from the 
perspective of economic, environmental, and social value added. It is strong in its ability to raise 
the awareness of the firm’s broader performance in the eyes of its managers, and helps to 
increase the accountability of firms. Along similar lines, Porter and Kramer (2011) recently 
argued that organizations should adopt a “shared value” approach that encourages the generation 
of profits that also create social benefits. The Triple Bottom Line and Porter and Kramer’s 
arguments are part of a rich stream of discussions in the management literature by business and 
society scholars under the label of corporate social responsibility (CSR). For these scholars, 
business has to think about not just economic value but the ways in which it creates value in 
social, environmental and moral terms.  CSR has become a vehicle for a wide array of scholars, 
critics and activists to criticize what they perceive as excessive self-concern by business elites 
and to encourage firms to bring more attention and resources to address issues (i.e. create 
“value”) across a range of topics such as the natural environment, sexual harassment, worker job-




Perhaps because of its moral foundation, stakeholder theory is often used to support CSR 
propositions (Phillips & Freeman, 2008; Phillips, Freeman & Wicks, 2003). However, 
stakeholder theory was not developed to advocate for societal interests nor was it about building 
value within entire economies - except to the extent that as firms create more value for 
themselves and their stakeholders they are, in essence, advancing the interests of society 
(Freeman, 1984; Walsh, 2005). Phillips and Freeman (2008), noted experts on the topic, “claim 
that stakeholder theory does not apply to entire economies (103).” According to Phillips (and 
reaffirmed in Phillips & Freeman, 2008), “ ‘Stakeholder’ is not synonymous with ‘citizen’ or 
‘moral agent’ as some wish to interpret it. Rather, a particular and much closer relationship 
between an organization and a constituency group is required for stakeholder status. The theory 
is delimited and non-stakeholder should remain a meaningful category (491).”  
It is precisely the way in which the TBL and CSR try to incorporate concerns for factors 
that extend beyond profits that differentiates them from a stakeholder approach. First, both 
approaches distinguish “economic” from “social” and “environmental” categories, reinforcing 
the idea that these are extra responsibilities for a traditional business. Such a conceptualization 
has been criticized for reinforcing the separation thesis – the notion that business and ethics (or 
society or the environment) are categorically and conceptually separate spheres of activity (see 
Freeman, 1994; Wicks, 1996). The language and conceptual tools used by TBL and CSR 
advocates makes the separation thesis an inevitable problem and feeds into the criticism of 
shareholder advocates like Friedman that “social responsibilities” are not only optional, but that 
they cut against the moral duties of managers.  
Second, the categories added for consideration (i.e., society and environment) are not 




External (rather than internal) firm forces draw attention to these factors. While stakeholders 
through their cooperation in firms will tend to want to improve society and not harm the 
environment, it isn’t clear the extent to which they will do so in their capacity as stakeholders. 
Thus, TBL and CSR differ from the perspective offered in this paper in that our factors are not 
shaped by society (e.g. public policy analysts) or environmental activists, but by what 
stakeholders seek as utility through their interactions with the firm. To that extent, one criticism 
of our stakeholder-based perspective may be that it lacks concern for society, the environment 
and minority interests, although stakeholders may bring these concerns with them as they judge 
the value of their affiliation with a firm. Firms that ignore the concerns of their stakeholders with 
regard to societal dimensions risk reducing the utility those stakeholders perceive they are 
getting from the firm. Rather than a weakness, this is simply a practical manifestation of the 
stakeholder approach as we have applied it. It is essential to have social and environmental 
concerns raised by other groups (e.g. governments, non-profits) to either encourage or require 
firms to improve their performance in areas that are of interest to society as a whole.  
Finally, it is not clear how the various factors in either the CSR approach or the Triple 
Bottom Line relate to each other and thus provide direction for managers beyond the hope that 
concern with non-economic factors may enhance the bottom line. In contrast, our model 
highlights the inter-connection of factors, how each relates to stakeholder utility, and why all are 
important to firm success.  
MEASURING THE VALUE CREATED THROUGH A FIRM’S ACTIVITIES 
An ongoing theme of this paper is that stakeholders receive value that extends beyond 
economic benefits. Consequently, measures of the utility created for stakeholders should 




researcher aspects of measuring utility are relevant to this discussion. Our discussion of the 
measurement implications for academic research is positivist in the sense that we are assuming a 
process based on technical analysis in which researchers use large samples of data and statistical 
methods to explain observable phenomena (Scherer & Patzer, 2011). Thus, the measures 
described in that section will be fairly objective in nature but not as rich as what might be 
obtained through personal involvement.  
On the other hand, we acknowledge that researchers may also become involved in case 
research in which they communicate directly with the focal actors to ascertain what they value 
and how the firm has influenced their well being. Scherer and Patzer (2011) refer to this 
approach as post-positivist, and explain that it is necessary when normative issues need to be 
addressed. The post-positivist or interpretive approach allows the researcher to determine 
whether observations are more a function of unchangeable laws or volatile situations that are 
subject to change. Participating with the focal actors in the information collection process allows 
an observer to gain a clearer picture of their interests, values, and the way they interpret the 
world (Habermas, 1990). The practitioner approach, discussed first, is almost entirely post-
positivist. Consequently, it allows for collection of rich information that is useful in 
understanding what the firm can do to serve its stakeholders and thus create more value. 
Practitioner Measures of Value Creation Through the Construct of Happiness 
There are a variety of ways one might specify and operationalize our 4-factor model (and 
the broader notion of stakeholder utility). The essential ingredients include 1) recognition that the 
purpose of a firm, and thus its performance, is based on the amount of value the firm provides to 
its stakeholders, 2) inclusion of both economic and non-economic factors that provide utility to 




different stakeholders are likely to value different things (i.e., their utility functions are different) 
and 5) measures should have the capacity to recognize a level of utility to stakeholders that 
exceeds mere satisfaction with the firm.  
The fifth requirement is essential because reciprocity and generalized exchange, which 
provide a foundation for the creation of additional value, require more than just a base level of 
stakeholder satisfaction (Bosse, et al., 2009; Harrison, et al., 2010). For example, a stakeholder 
that is merely satisfied with their affiliation with a firm or with the level of distributional 
(including economic), procedural, or interactional fairness may not have an incentive to cease 
relations with the firm but likewise is not particularly motivated to give additional effort, exhibit 
a high level of loyalty, engage in more value creating activities with, or provide more potentially 
valuable information to the firm. To tap into this additional value creating behavior the firm 
needs to provide a level of utility that is above the base level. We believe that one way to get at 
this higher level of utility is through the construct of happiness. That is, a stakeholder is not 
merely satisfied, but is happy (or potentially very happy) about the amount of utility received 
from one of more aspects of engaging with the firm. Happiness as a way of understanding utility 
received and thus the value provided to stakeholders builds from the ideas of Mill (1863) and 
connects to more recent writings (i.e., Gilbert, 2005; Haidt, 2006; Sidgwick, 1981; Shaw, 1999).  
Haidt’s (2006) work, in particular, is interesting in light of the utility-creating notions of 
organizational justice we have examined herein, as he advocates for respect, empathy, and a 
balance between internal and external factors as the keys to happiness. Our work runs in parallel 
with Haidt’s ideas on happiness in that external factors can be interpreted in terms of the tangible 
utility gained from goods and services and internal factors that come from the perceived utility 




esteem and satisfaction associated with affiliating with an organization that exhibits behavior that 
is considered virtuous. 
As Judge and Kammeyer-Mueller (2011) point out, most of the organizational research 
on happiness has been conducted in the context of work. However, happiness research is 
increasing in both volume and breadth (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2011; Judge & Kammeyer-
Mueller, 2011), and from a stakeholder perspective happiness is just as important to a supplier or 
customer as it is to an employee. We will define happiness in terms of the way stakeholders feel 
about the intangible and tangible utility they receive through their association and interactions 
with the firm. The idea of going directly to stakeholders to measure happiness is consistent with 
Gilbert’s (2005) observation that experience is only observable to the people who have it. As 
mentioned previously, it is a post-positivist or interpretative approach in which the investigator is 
involved directly with the subject (Scherer & Patzer, 2011). We are making this final connection 
because we believe it is more practical to measure stakeholder happiness than it is to try to 
measure the actual utility received, especially since each stakeholder has a different utility 
function, even within groups such as employees, customers or suppliers.  
Does heterogeneity within stakeholder groups make any attempt to measure happiness 
(and thus utility) meaningless? We believe it does not for two reasons. First, it is nearly 
impossible for a firm to make all of its stakeholders happy all of the time. Second, for reasons 
already elaborated upon in this manuscript, firms that have the potential to increase the amount 
of value they create make most of their stakeholders happy within each of their groups of 
legitimate stakeholders. Thus, if a high proportion of stakeholders within a group are unhappy it 
is a good indication that the firm has a problem in that area. According to the theory presented 




also mention one of the risks of collecting this sort of information is that the process can raise the 
expectations of stakeholders and thus make it more likely that the firm will disappoint them. 
Happiness, which psychologists often refer to as subjective well-being (Diener, Lucas & 
Oishi, 2002; Kahneman & Krueger, 2006), can be measured in a number of ways. Perhaps the 
most common is self-report questionnaires (Pavot & Diener, 1993). Because of potential 
problems associated with self-report measures such as situational priming and cognitive biases, 
researchers have also used a technique called Experience Sampling Method that has participants 
stop what they are doing and make notes on their experiences (Stone, Shiffman & DeVries, 
1999). Other techniques include informant reports from people who are close to the respondent 
(Sandvik, et al. 1993), coding of observational data (Frey & Stutzer, 2002) and memory recall of 
positive versus negative events (Siedlitz, Wyer & Diener, 1997). Information about stakeholder 
happiness may also be obtained from consultants and outside sources, such as rating agencies or 
reviews found in periodicals (i.e., Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work For”). 
If a relationship of trust has been established stakeholders are more likely to be honest 
about how happy they are, especially if distributional justice has been exhibited in the past and a 
stakeholder therefore believes that any additional value created in the firm as a result of the 
information they share is likely to improve their own situation. Overall happiness with the utility 
a stakeholder receives from a firm is important and is likely to influence stakeholder behavior; 
however, it may not be particularly helpful in terms of diagnosing problems or finding new ways 
to create value for stakeholders. Consequently, happiness should be measured for multiple 
dimensions for each primary stakeholder. Table 2 (left column) contains examples of the types of 
dimensions that might be measured. The list is not intended to be definitive, especially since 




point for those things firms might consider as they examine the value they are providing to their 
stakeholders. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Measures for Academic Research 
 Academic researchers may use a case-based method to gather rich information about the 
happiness of firm stakeholders. A case method is superior to large sample statistical studies 
based on objective measures if the goal is to sort out normative issues or to distinguish between 
constant influences and situational factors that are subject to change (Scherer & Patzer, 2011). 
However, frequently it is difficult to make generalizations based on case research that apply to a 
broader group of companies. For these situations, we believe that effective (albeit not perfect) 
measures can be selected from archival sources or obtained through primary sources such as 
surveys.  
Consistent with stakeholder theory, academic measures of organizational performance 
should be measured from the perspective of multiple stakeholders so as to capture as much value 
as possible. For example, in order to gain a more complete picture of the value created or 
destroyed in a large scale organizational change such as moving a headquarters or engaging in an 
acquisition, studies of these sorts of phenomena should include measures from the perspective of 
several stakeholder groups such as customers, employees, shareholders, suppliers and local 
communities, rather than focusing on just one. These measures should also address the idea that 
more value is created when the firm provides a level of utility to a stakeholder that goes above 
the norm (happiness). Consequently, the best measures allow firms to be compared to other firms 
in general or to firms in their industries. Multiple sources of information about a particular 




triangulation. Finally, proxies should be allowed. A researcher may not be able to ask a 
stakeholder directly how happy they are with a firm, but might be able to determine what the 
firm is doing for the stakeholder that can realistically make that stakeholder happy. For instance, 
although it is especially difficult to assess supplier happiness, there is one thing a firm can do 
that arguably makes a difference to the supplier—pay bills quickly. Consequently, a measure like 
cost of goods sold divided by accounts payable might serve as one possible proxy for the 
happiness of suppliers.  
The right column of Table 2 contains examples of a variety of possible measures of (and 
proxies for) value created for stakeholders. It is not intended to be exhaustive but rather 
representative of what is available or can be obtained through primary research. Several KLD 
variables are included in the table.2 Although the KLD data are oriented towards social 
responsibility (Sharman, 1996), a lot of it applies also to how a firm treats its stakeholders (see 
Berman, et al., 1999; Hillman & Keim, 2001). Frequently researchers combine the scores from 
five KLD areas to form a composite measure of performance: community, employees, diversity, 
the environment, and products. These measures consolidate values from over 50 KLD variables. 
We recommend instead that researchers examine each of the individual variables closely and 
include only those that best fit their theory (Chatterji & Levine, 2006) rather than relying on the 
five-factor measure simply because is has been used previously. Table 2 includes a number of 
KLD shareholder variables that have been left out of most of the empirical research using KLD 
data. Also included in the table are suggestions for proxies to measure value created for 
suppliers. We are not aware of any studies in the stakeholder literature that account for this 
important stakeholder. 
                                                     
2 In 2010 MSCI acquired RiskMetrics, who had previously acquired KLD (Kinder, Lydenberg & Domini) Research 
and Analytics. The KLD data are now called the ESG (environmental, social and governance) indexes, but to avoid 




DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This paper argues that the utility stakeholders seek is complex and pertains to more than 
just economic value. Firms that provide more utility to their stakeholders are better able to retain 
their participation and support. Furthermore, stakeholders depend on both the firm and its other 
stakeholders to satisfy their own interests. We develop a four-factor perspective on the utility 
stakeholders receive from a firm as a more complete construct of firm performance than popular 
financial performance measures. The stakeholder-based perspective of performance can help 
managers determine where their attention is needed in order facilitate the creation of more value. 
Collecting non-financial information on firm performance has also been found to enhance 
communication, learning and coordination within firms (Dossi & Patelli, 2010).  
Similarly, a stakeholder-based perspective on performance may lead researchers to 
consider the influence of organizational activities and phenomena on a much wider range of 
stakeholders. Indeed, our argument begins as an affirmation of Freeman’s (1984) original claim 
that attending to stakeholders and their interests is a critical starting point for managers and 
provides a foundation that drives their ongoing success. At present, there are very few studies 
that examine the influence of firm activities on a broad group of stakeholders (a notable 
exception is Waddock and Graves, 2006). For major advances to be made in the empirical 
stakeholder literature, stakeholder-based performance should be the dependent rather than the 
independent variable. We would also argue for further conceptual and empirical work examining 
our model (and rival perspectives on value for stakeholders).  
One issue for future research relates to the question of cooperation and conflict regarding 
stakeholders (and their interests). The argument made in this paper is that stakeholder theory 




Freeman, 1994; Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 2007). Stakeholders do not always cooperate, and 
their interests can conflict, particularly when one operates from a theoretical lens that highlights 
such potential conflict (e.g. agency theory). Thus, future work might explore an array of 
questions about cooperation and conflict among stakeholder interests raised by a focus on value 
creation. For example, there is need to further investigate the creation of processes and valid 
norms among stakeholders (e.g. Habermas, 1990) as a means of resolving (potential) conflicts in 
ways that are both normatively sound and instrumentally viable (e.g. Jones and Wicks, 1999). 
Similarly, there are potential conflicts between the utility that stakeholders and firms seek versus 
what society may value; research is needed both to document consistent kinds of gaps between 
the two potential means to close the gap (e.g. regulation, incentives, education, public policy). 
Future research might also explore whether the resources an organization expends in creating 
utility for its stakeholders is more than compensated for by the additional value created within 
the firm’s system.  
From a practical perspective, much of management research has focused on financial 
performance as the exclusive criterion of interest; thus, it tends to provide prescriptions that 
optimize financial performance rather than the total value created. For example, the merger and 
acquisitions literature has been dominated by research focusing on shareholder returns. 
Consequently, researchers and practitioners who use this literature to derive firm 
recommendations are biased in terms of maximizing the financial success of an acquisition rather 
than creating value in broad stakeholder terms. We understand by now that there are human costs 
associated with mergers and acquisitions, but what strategies can a firm making an acquisition 
use to reduce those costs and possibly even enhance value created for employees, communities, 




change? The same might be said for restructurings, joint ventures, new product development, 
various types of training programs, management succession, or plant location decisions. This 
shift in perspective opens up the ability to create more value (and a broader array of value) for 
stakeholders. Also, the perspective may lead managers to utilize moral imagination (Werhane, 
1999), seek creative solutions, and make choices that might otherwise seem counter-intuitive 
from a shareholder-dominated approach.  
Some scholars argue that there is a risk that too many performance measures will reduce 
the influence of any one measure in terms of what managers focus on (Chatterji & Levine, 2006; 
Jensen, 2001). However, unlike Jensen’s single performance objective, our perspective is about 
joint value maximization and the processes through which it is achieved (Zajac & Olsen, 1993). 
As managers focus on creating utility for their stakeholders, across both tangible and intangible 
factors, more value is created. Neglect of any one stakeholder could set off a downward spiral in 
the system as the firm’s other stakeholders respond to what they observe. Consequently, our 
position is that the real risk, from a managerial position, is that managers will become focused on 
too few objectives representing too few stakeholder interests, rather than too many. 
We would like to say in closing that it is not our intention to suggest that the four factors 
we have identified are the only important factors. We selected factors that are highly relevant to 
stakeholder theory (because our stated purpose was to provide a stakeholder-based model). Our 
factors are also closely associated with the amount of value a firm creates and is able to create in 
the future. They are broad based and include both economic and noneconomic factors, consistent 
with our argument that both types of factors are important to the amount of utility stakeholders 
receive from interactions with a firm. However, other factors may be found to be as or more 




Similarly, we use the happiness construct as an example of the way some of our ideas 
might be specified in research. Of course, happiness was also a part of some of the original 
writings on value and utility, and is regaining popularity as a variable of interest. One evidence 
of this fact is that the National People’s Congress in China recently declared that increasing 
happiness is more important than increasing GDP (Economist, 2011). Nonetheless, it would be a 
mistake to focus exclusively on stakeholder happiness in future research. One of the major 
themes of this paper is that multiple measures of firm performance are superior to just one (i.e., 
financial returns). A singular emphasis on happiness would be subject to the same criticisms. 
 Value, what it means, how it is created and how we measure it cuts to the core of our 
understanding of organizations. It also speaks to the fundamentals of what it means to live well, 
something that has been a perennial concern of ethicists (e.g. Solomon, 1992). This work 
highlights the need for actually doing the hard work of developing new measures of firm 
performance based on the value a firm creates for its stakeholders, and going out and gathering 
data – both for academics and for firms. From a managerial perspective, collecting this data can 
be a powerful signal to stakeholders about their commitment to them, can lead to innovation and 
enhanced efficiency because of the new information that is obtained during the process, and may 
provide more than mere intuition to guide the underlying logic of how a firm creates outstanding 
performance. Creating processes for engaging stakeholders and understanding value creation 
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A Sampling of Relevant Notions of “Value” 
 
Value in Exchange: the idea that value is based on how much a given item is within in a 
marketplace exchange (e.g. Adam Smith; Neoclassical Economics). Value here is negotiated and 
inter-subjective.  
 
Value of Use: value here is based on a subjective evaluation of how much an item is worth to a 
particular individual; may not be visible to others and may vary from zero to nearly infinite 
value.  
 
Value of Labor: value is based on how much labor was required to create an item (e.g. David 
Ricardo; Karl Marx; classical economics). Value here is determined independent of individual 
preferences and set by a quality inherent to the object (i.e. by labor).  
 
Value of Production: value is based on the total costs involved to produce an item (e.g. like 
Value of Labor, but adding in other related costs to produce an item). As with Value of Labor, 
value is set independent of individual preferences.  
 
Intrinsic v. Extrinsic Value: one way to think about value is whether it is intrinsic, or an inherent 
feature, of an item – or whether it is simply a vehicle or means to some other good (i.e. 
extrinsic). Most goods in the marketplace are “extrinsic”. A sandwich is good for satisfying my 
hunger; money helps me feel important or secure – both are “extrinsic” goods. However, some 
things are good in and of themselves. Kant calls a good will an inherent good; virtues also would 
qualify as inherent goods.  
 
Subjective v. Objective Value: related to the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic good is 
the contrast between subjective and objective notions of value. While there are numerous ways 
of defining both terms, subjective typically refers to the assessment of an individual and what 
they happen to like, while objective typically refers to a norm that operates across individuals or 
at a higher level of analysis (e.g. a universal moral norm; a social value; a human right).  
 






Examples of Performance Measures from Multiple Stakeholder Perspectives 
 Potential Categories for Measuring Happiness/Well-being Potential Proxies for Researchers  
Employees • Various components of employment contract (i.e., pay, benefits, 
perquisites) 
• Perceived fairness of decision making processes 
• Perceived treatment (i.e., respect, inclusiveness) 
• Perceived authenticity (i.e., what firm says, it does) 
• Consistency between stated vs. realized firm values (i.e., honesty) 
• Promotion policies/upward mobility 
• Firm’s environmental performance 
• Firm’s position/performance on other societal issues 
• Also, objective measures such as turnover, legal actions 
• Compensation and benefits 
• Workplace benefits (i.e., fitness center, child care) 
• Legal actions or, if unionized, grievances 
• Productivity measures 
• Inclusion on list of best companies to work for 
• Internal promotions to top management 
• Turnover 
• KLD Health and Safety Concern or Strength 
• KLD Workforce Reductions 
• KLD Pension/Benefits Concern or Strength 
• KLD Cash Profit Sharing 
Customers • Product/service features 
• Perceived treatment during transactions (i.e., respect, fairness) 
• Perceived authenticity (i.e., what firm says, it does) 
• Firm’s environmental performance 
• Firm’s position/performance on other societal issues 
• Also, objective measures such as repeat business, legal actions 
• Growth in sales 
• Consumer reports on products/services 
• Reputation rankings 
• KLD Product Safety Concern 
• KLD Marketing or Contracting Controversy 
• KLD Quality Ranking of Products 
• KLD R&D/Innovation Ranking 
Suppliers • Perceived treatment during transactions (i.e., respect, fairness) 
• Firm’s environmental performance 
• Firm’s position/performance on other societal issues 
• Nature of payments (i.e., size, speed) 
• Also, objective measures such as longevity, availability of supplies 
• Days payable (from accounting statements) 
• Longevity of supplier relationships (available in 10-K for some firms) 
• Legal actions 
Shareholders • Financial returns 
• Perceived riskiness of investment  
• Governance structure and policies 
• Disclosure of pertinent information/transparency 
• Firm’s environmental performance 
• Firm’s position/performance on other societal issues 
• Also, objective data on returns and risk 
• Shareholder returns 
• Price-to-earnings ratio (P/E) 
• Risk associated with returns (i.e., variance and beta) 
• Number of shareholder proposals 
• Compensation levels of top managers (KLD Compensation High or Low) 
• KLD Ownership Concern 
Community • Perceived impact on community/environment (per community 
leaders or general perceptions) 
• Perception of integrity of firm 
• Also, objective data on number of positive/negative encounters, 
community service, charitable and infrastructure contributions 
• Tax breaks or other advantages provided to the firm 
• New local regulations that affect firm 
• Legal actions 
• KLD Tax Disputes or Investment Controversies 




• KLD Generous Giving 
 
